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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
On May 13, 1985, now more than thirteen years ago, the 
City of Philadelphia police dropped a bomb on 6221 Osage 
Avenue, a building occupied by several members of a group 
called "MOVE," killing eleven of the thirteen people inside, 
devastating the West Philadelphia community, and bringing 
national attention to the actions taken that day by the City 
of Philadelphia officials involved in the incident. This appeal 
requires us to revisit that confrontation. 
 
Only two parties have participated in this appeal, 
whittled down from the dozens of plaintiffs and defendants 
previously involved in this massive litigation. Here, the City 
of Philadelphia appeals that portion of the judgment 
entered against it and in favor of Ms. Ramona Africa on her 
civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983.1 
 
The City's sole argument on appeal is that, as a matter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Ms. Africa has filed a separate appeal from that portion of the 
judgment entered against her and in favor of William Richmond, 
Philadelphia's former Fire Commissioner, and Gregore Sambor, 
Philadelphia's former Police Commissioner, on her state law battery 
claims. In a companion case decided today, we have affirmed the 
judgment in favor of Richmond and Sambor. See In re City of Phila. 
Litig., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 1998). 
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of law, its conduct did not amount to a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. We hold that because the evidence 
contained in the summary judgment record, upon which we 
previously relied to determine that the City's actions were 
sufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, was 
also presented at trial, we are bound under the law of the 
case doctrine to our prior seizure determination. 
Accordingly, in conformance with our prior holding, we are 
required to reject the City's argument that its conduct was 
legally insufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment 
seizure. We therefore will affirm the judgment entered on 
Ms. Africa's civil rights claim against the City. 
 
I. 
 
The controversial events forming the basis of this 
litigation were highly publicized and have been recounted in 
several published opinions. See, e.g., In re City of Phila. 
Litig., 49 F.3d 945 (3d Cir. 1995); In re City of Phila. Litig., 
938 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Pa. 1996); In re City of Phila. Litig., 
849 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Africa v. City of Phila., 
809 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1992). Accordingly, we will 
assume familiarity with this case and will present only an 
abbreviated synopsis of the background relevant to this 
appeal. 
 
A. 
 
On May 11, 1985, arrest warrants were issued for several 
MOVE members, including Ms. Africa, and search warrants 
were issued for 6221 Osage Avenue in West Philadelphia 
upon a judicial finding of probable cause. After 
Philadelphia's district attorney informed Philadelphia Mayor 
Wilson Goode that the court had issued the warrants, 
Goode instructed Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor to 
execute the warrants. 
 
The City evacuated residents from the Osage Avenue 
neighborhood on May 12, 1985. At approximately 3:00 a.m. 
the next morning, police and firefighters assumed their 
positions surrounding 6221 Osage Avenue. At 
approximately 5:30 a.m., Commissioner Sambor announced 
over a bullhorn that the MOVE residents had fifteen 
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minutes to vacate the premises and surrender. MOVE 
members responded over a loudspeaker with threats of 
violence. After the allotted time elapsed, the City began 
attempts to infuse the house with tear gas to force 
evacuation. 
 
Police entered adjoining houses in order to blow holes in 
common walls for the insertion of tear gas canisters. During 
the attempts to infuse the tear gas, MOVE membersfired 
on police officers from within 6221 Osage Avenue and from 
a wooden bunker located on the roof of the building. Due 
to the gunfire and the fact that MOVE had fortified the 
common walls, the infusion attempts proved ineffective. As 
a result, the police retreated from the adjoining buildings. 
 
Sometime around 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, City officials 
met to discuss a new strategy. They concluded that any 
further attempt to execute the warrants by gassing the 
house would fail as long as the bunker on the roof afforded 
MOVE members a tactical advantage. After considering 
several alternatives, they agreed to drop a satchel 
containing explosives onto the bunker from a helicopter. 
The officials hoped that this "bomb" would disable the 
bunker or blow a hole in the roof through which tear gas 
could be inserted.2 
 
Shortly after the police dropped the bomb, a fire broke 
out on the roof. Upon learning of the fire, Police 
Commissioner Gregore Sambor and Fire Commissioner 
William Richmond conferred and determined that they 
should let the fire burn until it neutralized the bunker. 
Richmond's sworn testimony before the MOVE Commission 
on October 30, 1985 regarding this conversation, which 
was played to the jury, was as follows: 
 
        Commissioner Sambor said to me something to the 
       effect, "Can we control that fire?" And my response -- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The term "bomb" may have connotations which do not accurately 
reflect the properties of the device the City employed. Testimony 
established that prior to the dropping of the device, the possibility of a 
fire resulting from its application was determined to be negligible. In 
addition, the explosives used were not encased in metal. For purposes of 
simplicity, however, we will use the term "bomb" to denote the device the 
City dropped on the bunker. 
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       and I'm a cautious person by nature. I said, "I think we 
       can . . . ." 
 
       *  *  * 
 
        I told him essentially that, that I thought we could 
       contain the spread at that point. He said, "Let's let the 
       bunker burn to eliminate the high ground advantage 
       and the tactical advantage of the bunker," and I said, 
       "Okay." I acquiesced, I agreed. 
 
This testimony was consistent with Sambor's testimony at 
trial; Sambor testified that he asked Richmond if he could 
control the fire if they "let the fire go to get the bunker" and 
that Richmond responded in the affirmative. 
 
Mayor Goode, who had returned to City Hall, never 
authorized the use of fire as a police tactic and testified 
that he would have ordered Richmond to put the fire out 
immediately had anyone contacted him. Philadelphia 
Managing Director Leo Brooks remained on the scene and 
testified that he ordered Sambor to have the fire put out as 
soon as he noticed the fire and was able to contact Sambor. 
Brooks' testimony conflicted with other trial testimony, 
however, that suggested that Brooks initially acquiesced in 
the decision to let the fire burn. In re City of Phila. Litig., 
938 F. Supp. at 1289-90 n.10, 1292-93 n.13 (discussing 
conflicting testimony). 
 
Sometime after the City officials noticed thefire, Brooks 
ordered Sambor to put the fire out and firefighters began 
taking steps to fight the fire. The fire, however, burned out 
of control despite the City's efforts to fight it. The roof 
eventually caved in, the bunker dropped through to the 
second floor, and the fire consumed the house and burned 
numerous neighboring buildings. With the exception of Ms. 
Africa and one child, who emerged from the house 
approximately two hours after the bomb fell, everyone 
inside the building perished. Ms. Africa was taken into 
custody without resistance after evacuating the burning 
building. 
 
B. 
 
The confrontation spawned scores of lawsuits, most of 
which settled before trial. In re City of Phila. Litig., 938 F. 
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Supp. at 1280. Ms. Africa asserted several claims against 
various defendants including the claim at issue in this 
appeal, a claim based upon 42 U.S.C. S 1983 alleging an 
unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
The individual defendants moved for summary judgment 
on Ms. Africa's section 1983 claim arguing that there was 
no constitutional violation, and, in the alternative, that they 
were entitled to qualified immunity. In re City of Phila. 
Litig., 849 F. Supp. at 355, 359. The district court granted 
summary judgment on Ms. Africa's section 1983 claim in 
favor of all defendants with respect to the decision to drop 
the bomb. See In re City of Phila. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 212, 
214 (E.D. Pa. 1995)(explaining the import of the January 3, 
1994 bench opinion and the January 5, 1994 order). The 
district court denied summary judgment, however, in favor 
of defendants Richmond, Sambor and Brooks holding that 
those defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity 
with respect to their decision to let the fire burn. In re City 
of Phila. Litig., 849 F. Supp. at 342, 345. In addition, the 
court held that the City was not entitled to summary 
judgment because Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond were 
final policymakers whose decision to let the fire burn could 
bind the City under Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of 
the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id. at 345-46. 
 
In the days that followed, the parties filed various 
motions requesting the court to facilitate an immediate 
appeal. Finding that the interests of justice warranted 
immediate appellate review, the court entered final 
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on all claims in 
favor of Goode and several other individual defendants, but 
not Brooks, Richmond or Sambor. The court also certified 
for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) that 
portion of its order denying summary judgment to the City. 
Specifically, the court certified for appeal the issue of 
whether Brooks, Richmond or Sambor are final 
policymakers whose decision could bind the City for 
purposes of Ms. Africa's section 1983 claim. In re City of 
Phila. Litig., 1994 WL 46654, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1994). 
The parties appealed. 
 
                                6 
  
We reversed in part, affirmed in part, and dismissed in 
part for lack of jurisdiction. In re City of Phila. Litig., 49 
F.3d 945 (3d Cir. 1995).3 With respect to the individual 
defendants' appeal of the district court's order denying 
them summary judgment on the basis of qualified 
immunity, we unanimously determined the collateral order 
doctrine as set forth in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 
(1985), provides us with jurisdiction to consider the 
qualified immunity issue. Id. at 956-57. 
 
In analyzing the qualified immunity issue, we applied the 
familiar test announced in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982), that "government officials performing 
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known." In keeping 
with the Harlow test, we first considered whether Ms. Africa 
had alleged facts that stated an excessive force claim. See 
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991). We 
concluded that Ms. Africa alleged a constitutional violation 
by alleging that the defendants exerted excessive force in 
attempting to effectuate her arrest by dropping a bomb on 
the roof and letting the fire burn. In re City of Phila. Litig., 
49 F.3d at 962. 
 
Having concluded that Ms. Africa alleged 
unconstitutional conduct, we next examined the 
undisputed factual record to determine whether Ms. Africa 
possessed a clearly established constitutional right to be 
free from the forces allegedly exerted by the individual 
defendants under the circumstances that existed on May 
13, 1985. Id. at 962-69, 973-75. As part of this inquiry, we 
determined that under the summary judgment record as 
examined in the light most favorable to Ms. Africa, the 
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the bomb 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our decision included opinions from each judge on the panel. See id. 
at 948 (Opinion of Greenberg, J.), 973 (Opinion of Scirica, J.), 976 
(Opinion of Lewis, J.). Because an agreement on any given issue of two 
of the three judges constitutes our holding on that issue, our holdings 
are found by compiling various statements found throughout the three 
opinions. 
 
                                7 
  
and resulting fire effectuated a Fourth Amendment seizure 
because they were the very instrumentalities set in motion 
in order to arrest Ms. Africa. Id. at 973-74, 976; see also 
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
 
Once we determined that the summary judgment record 
supported a Fourth Amendment seizure, we next examined 
whether the individual defendants actions were objectively 
reasonable as a matter of law. In re City of Phila. Litig., 49 
F.3d at 965-69, 974, 976-78. We determined that they were 
not. We found that under the summary judgment record, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the decision to use the 
bomb was an excessive use of force. Id. 
 
We next analyzed whether the defendants reasonably 
could have considered their actions to be lawful. Id. at 970- 
72. We determined that they could. We reasoned that 
because "[t]he 1985 MOVE confrontation was 
unprecedented in the case law," it was not possible to say 
that the unlawfulness of either dropping the bomb or 
letting the fire burn should have been apparent to a 
reasonable law enforcement official. Id. at 971-72. We 
accordingly granted all individual defendants qualified 
immunity. 
 
In analyzing the City's liability in allowing thefire to 
burn, we concluded that because the decisions of Brooks, 
Richmond and Sambor could fairly be attributed to the City 
under Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 
(1978), the City was not entitled to summary judgment. In 
re City of Phila. Litig., 49 F.3d at 972, 975. We also 
suggested that, in light of our holding on the City's liability 
for allowing the fire to burn, Ms. Africa may wish to seek 
relief from the district court's decision granting partial 
summary judgment in favor of the City on the decision to 
drop the bomb. Id. at 973.4 On remand, the district court 
reinstated the "drop the bomb" claim against the City at 
Ms. Africa's request. In re City of Phila. Litig., 910 F. Supp. 
212, 216-18 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 
Trial commenced on April 23, 1996 and continued into 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Ms. Africa had not appealed the district court's ruling that the City 
was entitled to summary judgment on the decision to drop the bomb. Id. 
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the summer of 1996. The City moved for judgment as a 
matter of law at the close of the evidence on June 7, 1996, 
contending that Ms. Africa was never seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. The court denied that motion. On 
June 24, 1996, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. 
Africa and against the City on her section 1983 claim. 
 
Following the verdict, the City orally renewed its motion 
for judgment as a matter of law in open court under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 50(b). The court denied the City's motion. In re 
City of Phila. Litig., 938 F. Supp. 1278, 1282-84 (E.D. Pa. 
1996). In considering the City's motion, the court 
interpreted our previous decision as holding that a jury 
could reasonably find a seizure based on the summary 
judgment record. The court specifically rejected the City's 
position that, as a matter of law, no seizure occurred 
because "the substance of the argument has already been 
rejected by the Court of Appeals." Id. at 1283. Noting that 
the trial evidence did not materially deviate from the 
summary judgment evidence before us, the court 
interpreted our prior decision as precluding relitigation of 
the seizure issue. Id. at 1284. Accordingly, the district court 
entered final judgment against the City on Ms. Africa's 
section 1983 claim by order dated August 27, 1996. The 
City filed this timely appeal. 
 
II. 
 
In this appeal, the primary inquiry before us is the extent 
to which we are now bound by our prior determination 
that, under the summary judgment record, the City seized 
Ms. Africa. Specifically, we must determine the extent to 
which that prior determination controls our resolution of 
the City's assertion that its conduct was legally insufficient 
to constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. To resolve this 
issue, we must initially determine whether our prior 
determination constitutes the law of the case. 
 
Under the law of the case doctrine, one panel of an 
appellate court generally will not reconsider questions that 
another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same 
case. The doctrine is designed to protect traditional ideals 
such as finality, judicial economy and jurisprudential 
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integrity. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 
U.S. 800, 816 (1988); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 
618-19 (1983). The law of the case doctrine, however, acts 
to preclude review of only those legal issues that the court 
in a prior appeal actually decided, either expressly or by 
implication; it does not apply to dicta. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 414, 429 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 
In addition, the law of the case doctrine does not restrict 
a court's power but rather governs its exercise of discretion. 
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. 
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Accordingly, we have recognized that the doctrine does not 
preclude our reconsideration of previously decided issues in 
extraordinary circumstances such as where: (1) new 
evidence is available; (2) a supervening new law has been 
announced; or (3) the earlier decision was clearly erroneous 
and would create manifest injustice. Id. at 116-17. 
 
In order to determine whether the law of the case 
doctrine governs our resolution of this appeal, we therefore 
must determine: (1) whether our prior determination on 
seizure was dicta; and (2) whether this case falls into any 
of the categories of extraordinary circumstances which 
would free us from the constraints of the law of the case 
doctrine. 
 
A. 
 
The City contends that the prior panel's seizure analysis 
is dicta because a determination on whether a seizure 
existed under the summary judgment record was not 
required for our resolution of the issues on appeal. 
Specifically, the City asserts that the prior panel only had 
jurisdiction to determine: 1) whether the district court had 
properly granted summary judgment on the grounds of 
qualified immunity in favor of certain defendants; 2) 
whether the district court had improperly denied summary 
judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity to certain 
other defendants; and 3) whether the district court had 
improperly denied the City summary judgment on the 
federal claim by finding that the City could be held liable 
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for the individual defendants' actions. The City argues that 
because the court's seizure analysis was not required for its 
resolution of any of these issues, that analysis is dicta and 
therefore does not bind us under the law of the case 
doctrine. The City also contends that it would be unfair for 
us to apply the prior panel's determination on seizure to 
the City because the City did not brief the issue in the prior 
appeal and because the issue arose in the context of the 
individual defendants' appeal of the district court's qualified 
immunity ruling. We disagree with both contentions. 
 
It is axiomatic that the qualified immunity inquiry 
focuses on whether an official's conduct violated clearly 
established constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982). It is equally clear that the threshold 
determinations which inform a court's qualified immunity 
analysis are whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of 
a constitutional right and whether that constitutional right 
was clearly established at the time the defendants allegedly 
violated that right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 
(1991). In determining whether a defendant's conduct 
impinged upon clearly established constitutional rights, the 
courts are required to conduct more than a generalized 
inquiry into whether an abstract constitutional right is 
implicated. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 
(1987). The level of specificity required must establish that 
the contours of the constitutional right alleged are 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that his actions violate that right. Id. at 640. 
Accordingly, a court's determination as to whether an 
official's conduct violated clearly established law must be 
premised upon an application of the facts as alleged by the 
plaintiff to the constitutional standards which were clearly 
established at the time of the official's conduct. See 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1597 (1998)(noting 
that in resolving the threshold issue of qualified immunity, 
"the court must determine whether, assuming the truth of 
the plaintiff 's allegations, the official's conduct violated 
clearly established law."); Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 
F.3d 116, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1996)(holding that the qualified 
immunity inquiry requires an analysis of the summary 
judgment record, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
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to establish if the specific actions alleged violated a clearly 
established constitutional right). 
 
The prior panel therefore was required to determine 
whether the actions of the City officials, as alleged by Ms. 
Africa, violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
an unreasonable seizure as that right was understood at 
the time by reasonable City officials. Inherent in this 
inquiry is the determination of whether the City officials' 
alleged actions rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment 
violation; if the alleged actions are insufficient to amount to 
a Fourth Amendment violation, the City officials' actions 
could not possibly violate a clearly established 
constitutional right. Resolution of the question of whether 
there was a Fourth Amendment violation based upon the 
summary judgment record therefore was integral to the 
court's qualified immunity analysis. 
 
This conclusion is amply supported by the decisions of 
our sister courts of appeals that have resolved the qualified 
immunity inquiry by holding that the defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity because their alleged conduct 
did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, 
e.g., Jones v. Collins, 132 F.3d 1048, 1052 (5th Cir. 
1998)(determining on interlocutory appeal that the 
defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because the 
summary judgment evidence, construed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, indicates that the defendant did 
not violate plaintiff 's constitutional rights); Latta v. Keryte, 
118 F.3d 693, 699 (10th Cir. 1997)(granting qualified 
immunity to defendants in part because plaintiff had not 
established a Fourth Amendment seizure); Roe v. Sherry, 
91 F.3d 1270, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1996)(granting qualified 
immunity to defendants because plaintiff had not 
established the violation of a constitutional right). As 
illustrated by these cases, the prior panel could have 
disposed of the qualified immunity issue by holding that 
the defendants' alleged conduct did not rise to the level of 
a constitutional violation. In fact, one of the three judges on 
the prior panel would have so held. See In re Phila. Litig., 
49 F.3d at 962-65 (Greenberg, J., dissenting in part). 
Accordingly, the panel's seizure determination was 
necessarily subsumed within the court's analysis of the 
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qualified immunity issue and therefore does not constitute 
dicta to which the law of the case doctrine would not apply.5 
 
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the City's 
secondary argument that applying the prior panel's seizure 
ruling to the City would be unfair because that issue was 
analyzed with respect to the individual defendants and 
because the City did not brief the issue. The City's appeal 
was before us because the district court certified its order 
denying the City's motion for summary judgment pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). As the Court made clear in Yamaha 
Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 204 (1996), appellate 
courts may exercise jurisdiction over any question that is 
fairly included in an order certified for interlocutory appeal; 
our jurisdiction is not limited to examining only that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We need not be detained by the City's argument that because our 
jurisdiction over the issue of qualified immunity was premised upon the 
collateral order doctrine, we lacked jurisdiction to determine the seizure 
issue under Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). In Mitchell, the 
Court emphasized that the denial of qualified immunity is appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine because a question of immunity is 
separable from the merits of the underlying action. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 
527-29. The Court in Mitchell also recognized, however, that while an 
immunity claim is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff 
's 
claim, courts must nonetheless consider plaintiff's factual allegations in 
resolving the immunity issue. Id. at 528-29. It is clear from a close 
reading of Mitchell and from subsequent qualified immunity 
jurisprudence that while the collateral order doctrine does not afford 
jurisdiction to determine the ultimate merits of a constitutional claim, 
the collateral order doctrine does afford courts the jurisdiction to 
effectively examine the merits of a claim for qualified immunity by 
determining whether, under the summary judgment record as examined 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant's actions 
violate 
a clearly established constitutional right. Furthermore, we have already 
implicitly rejected the City's argument on this point in Brown v. 
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1109-11(3d Cir. 1990), where we held that 
nothing in Mitchell precludes our review of whether the evidence adduced 
by the plaintiff as to the conduct of the defendants substantiates the 
violation of a cognizable constitutional claim. We therefore are confident 
that the prior panel had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine 
to determine whether, under the largely undisputed summary judgment 
record examined in the light most favorable to Ms. Africa, the City 
officials' actions were sufficient to constitute a Fourth Amendment 
seizure. 
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question that the district court has identified in its 
certification. Had the prior panel concluded that a seizure 
had not occurred as a matter of law, the panel could have 
disposed of the City's appeal on that basis. Accordingly, the 
City had fair warning that the seizure issue could be 
considered on appeal and nothing precluded the City from 
briefing the issue. 
 
B. 
 
Having determined that our prior seizure determination is 
not dicta and is therefore subject to the law of the case 
doctrine, we turn to our evaluation of whether any of the 
traditional exceptions to the law of the case doctrine apply 
to free us from its constraints. Specifically, wefind it 
necessary to examine two of our three previously recognized 
exceptional circumstances: whether new evidence is 
available and whether our prior decision was clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. 
 
1. 
 
The district court concluded that the evidence presented 
at trial did not significantly deviate from the summary 
judgment record and the City has not challenged that 
assessment on appeal. In re Phila. Litig., 938 F. Supp. at 
1284. After independently reviewing the trial testimony and 
the summary judgment record, we also find that the 
evidence presented at each of these stages of this 
proceeding was substantially similar. Compare In re Phila. 
Litig., 49 F.3d at 948-52 (recounting the factual 
background from the summary judgment record upon 
which the first panel based its decision) with  our recitation 
of the facts as adduced at trial, supra, Section I-A. 
 
The sole significant exception to this conclusion relates to 
trial testimony offered by Mayor Goode. At trial, Goode 
testified that immediately prior to a press conference 
regarding the May 13, 1985 events, Goode confronted 
Richmond and Sambor as they were walking down the hall 
towards the Mayor's Reception Room and asked them who 
gave the order to let the fire burn. Goode testified that 
Sambor responded that he had given the order and that he 
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was trying to get MOVE members out of the building. It is 
not evident that similar testimony from the summary 
judgment record was drawn to the prior panel's attention in 
the initial appeal. 
 
Even though this additional evidence may not have been 
considered in the prior panel's analysis, we do notfind that 
this "new evidence" warrants a departure from the law of 
the case doctrine. This additional evidence acts only to 
support the prior panel's conclusion that a seizure 
occurred; it does not detract from the evidence at the 
summary judgment stage upon which the panel relied. 
Accordingly, because all of the summary judgment evidence 
upon which the panel relied in determining that the City 
had effectuated a seizure was presented at trial, the 
exceptional circumstance of new evidence does not apply to 
preclude the application of the law of the case doctrine to 
this case. 
 
2. 
 
We turn now to the exceptional circumstance presented 
when a prior determination is clearly erroneous and would 
work a manifest injustice. In determining whether we 
should refuse to treat our prior decision as law of the case 
under this exception, we are reminded that the question of 
whether Ms. Africa was seized as a matter of law is not 
before us as a matter of first impression. The prior panel, 
to which we owe a certain degree of deference, has already 
ruled on this issue. Our current task is to evaluate that 
prior determination solely for clear error. It is therefore 
incumbent upon the City to persuade us not only that our 
prior decision was wrong, but that it was clearly wrong and 
that adherence to that decision would create manifest 
injustice. This the City has failed to do. 
 
At this stage of the litigation, we need only address the 
merits of the City's seizure argument to the degree 
necessary to determine whether the prior panel's decision 
was clearly wrong. The City contends that under Brower v. 
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), their conduct does not 
constitute a seizure as a matter of law. Specifically, the City 
argues that the bomb was not intended to effectuate Ms. 
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Africa's seizure but rather was a measure taken solely 
against the bunker. Accordingly, Ms. Africa's freedom of 
movement, the City argues, was not terminated through the 
very means intentionally applied to effectuate her seizure as 
required by Brower. 
 
In Brower, the Supreme Court set forth the current 
standard for evaluating Fourth Amendment seizures. The 
Court ruled that a police effectuated roadblock specifically 
designed to stop a fleeing suspect constitutes a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment. In so holding, the Court 
noted that violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an 
intentional acquisition of physical control and that 
although a seizure occurs even when an unintended person 
or thing is the object of the detention, the detention itself 
must be willful. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
 
To further explicate the intent element necessary for a 
Fourth Amendment seizure, the Court offered the following 
hypotheticals: 
 
        Thus, if a parked and unoccupied police car slips its 
       brake and pins a passerby against a wall, it is likely 
       that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the 
       Fourth Amendment. And the situation would not 
       change if the passerby happened, by lucky chance, to 
       be a serial murderer for whom there was an 
       outstanding arrest warrant -- even if, at the time he 
       was thus pinned, he was in the process of running 
       away from two pursuing constables. It is clear, in other 
       words, that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not 
       occur whenever there is a governmentally caused 
       termination of an individual's freedom of movement 
       (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever there is a 
       governmentally caused and governmentally desired 
       termination of an individual's freedom of movement 
       (the fleeing felon), but only when there is a 
       governmental termination of freedom of movement 
       through means intentionally applied. That is the reason 
       there was no seizure [when a suspect lost control and 
       crashed during a police chase.] The pursuing police car 
       sought to stop the suspect only by the show of 
       authority represented by flashing lights and continuing 
       pursuit; and though he was in fact stopped, he was 
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       stopped by a different means -- his loss of control of 
       his vehicle and the subsequent crash. If, instead of 
       that, the police cruiser had pulled alongside thefleeing 
       care and sideswiped it, producing the crash, then the 
       termination of the suspect's freedom of movement 
       would have been a seizure. 
 
Id. at 596-97(emphasis in original). The Court also made 
clear that in determining whether the means that 
terminates the freedom of movement is the very means the 
government intended, it is impractical to conduct an 
inquiry into an officer's subjective intent. As clarified by the 
Court: 
 
       In determining whether the means that terminates the 
       freedom of movement is the very means that the 
       government intended we cannot draw too fine a line, or 
       we will be driven to saying that one is not seized who 
       has been stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun 
       with which he was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by 
       a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg. 
       We think it enough for a seizure that a person be 
       stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or 
       put in place in order to achieve that result. 
 
Id. at 598-99. 
 
In our prior decision, we applied the teachings of Brower 
and determined that there had been a seizure based upon 
the summary judgment record. Specifically, we held that 
the bomb was the very instrumentality set in motion in 
order to achieve the seizure of the MOVE members. In re 
Phila. Litig., 49 F.3d at 974. We analogized this situation to 
one of the hypotheticals offered by the Brower Court, i.e., 
the seizure that results when a person is stopped by the 
accidental discharge of a gun with which he was meant 
only to be bludgeoned. Id. We reasoned that our inquiry is 
not whether the officials intended all of the consequences of 
their use of the bomb, but rather whether they intended to 
use force to arrest the MOVE members. We concluded that 
they did and that the City actions therefore amounted to a 
seizure under Brower. Id. (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 599). 
 
We find this to be a plausible reading of Brower. While 
courts have struggled with conflicting language in Brower 
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and have often reached contrary results, we think it 
reasonable to read Brower as focusing on the objective 
intent of officials to use force to effectuate a seizure and the 
subsequent seizure flowing from the use of that force, 
rather than upon the subjective intent of officials to 
effectuate a seizure by the exact use of force they have 
chosen to employ. See generally, Keller v. Frink, 745 F. 
Supp. 1428 (S.D. Ind. 1990)(applying Brower to hold that a 
jury could find that an officer seized a fleeing suspects 
when he fired his weapon at the suspects' van, purportedly 
to identify it for future identification, and inadvertently shot 
the driver in the back). While the prior panel's seizure 
analysis was certainly not mandated by Brower, neither 
was it precluded by Brower. Accordingly, wefind that our 
prior seizure determination was not clearly erroneous. 
 
Because we find that our prior seizure determination is 
not clearly erroneous, the exceptional circumstance of a 
clearly erroneous decision that would work a manifest 
injustice does not apply to preclude the application of the 
law of the case doctrine. Even if we were to conclude that 
our prior decision was clearly erroneous, however, we 
would nevertheless adhere to that ruling because it does 
not create a manifest injustice in this case. As previously 
noted, Mayor Goode testified at trial that Sambor told him 
that he let the fire burn to force the MOVE members out of 
the house. Were we to assume the veracity of this 
testimony, which we must, we would easily conclude that, 
under any reading of Brower, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that the City effectuated a seizure of Ms. Africa in 
this case. Accordingly, adherence to our prior seizure 
analysis, even if erroneous under the summary judgment 
record, does not create a manifest injustice as applied post- 
trial in light of Goode's trial testimony. 
 
Because our prior holding on the seizure issue is not 
dicta and because none of our traditionally recognized 
exceptional circumstances preclude application of the law 
of the case doctrine to that determination, we find that our 
prior determination that the City seized Ms. Africa under 
the summary judgment record is the law of this case. 
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III. 
 
Our determination that our prior seizure ruling is subject 
to the law of the case doctrine, however, does not end our 
inquiry. While we have determined that we are bound by 
our prior ruling, the question we have yet to answer is the 
extent to which our prior panel's holding that a seizure 
occurred under the summary judgment record binds us in 
our determination of whether the City is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law post-trial. 
 
We recognize that the issue currently before us is not 
identical to the issue we previously determined. As 
previously noted, however, the evidence contained in the 
summary judgment record upon which we previously relied 
to determine that the City's actions were sufficient to 
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, was also presented 
at trial. In addition, nothing presented at trial detracted 
from the summary judgment evidence upon which we 
based our seizure determination. We therefore find that 
because the evidence was at least as strong at trial on the 
issue of seizure as it was at the summary judgment stage, 
our prior ruling that a seizure occurred controls our 
resolution of this appeal. Accordingly, we hold that the 
City's actions were legally sufficient to constitute a seizure. 
Any other ruling would insufficiently adhere to our prior 
resolution of the seizure issue which is the law of this case. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
entered against the City on Ms. Africa's section 1983 claim. 
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